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FORCES UNDERLYING THE NAZI REVOLUTION

by

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with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

THE RISE OF GERMAN NATIONALISM

THE Hitler Third Reich is now an accoml plished fact. Both democratic forms and terroristic methods have been used to destroy the Weimar Republic and set up a Fascist dictatorship. The National Socialist German Workers' party rules supreme in Germany, for after five and one-half months in office Hitler and his lieutenants have dissolved or "coordinated" all other political parties; Germany has been completely unified; all opposition has been ruthlessly suppressed; and the ground has thus been cleared for the practical application of Nazi principles. The following report describes the philosophical and ideological background of the National Socialist party, and analyzes the Nazi program which may be expected to determine the future policies of the Reich.1

At the last Reichstag election on March 5, 1933, more than 17 million Germans—comprising 44 per cent of the electorate—cast their votes for the National Socialist party, thus giving expression to an unparalleled unanimity of opinion in a country noted for particularist sentiment. These 17 million voters were drawn primarily from three sources: the youth of Germany who have come of age since the war, former supporters of the numerous conservative small bourgeois parties, and previous non-voters who were roused from political lethargy by economic disaster and National Socialist propaganda.

Despite the thoroughness and effectiveness of Nazi agitation, the success of the movement can only be explained by the psychological, physical and material suffering which the German people have undergone during the past two decades. The ideology and philosophy of the movement, however, have their roots far in the past. It is not only a mass protest against the hardships endured during and since the war, it is also a form of self-vindication for a people which, although trained and educated in a militarized state, were defeated in a great war. It is at the same time a national attempt to escape from

the harsh realities of the present by resurrecting many of the attributes of the past which to a suffering people seems glorious in retrospect, and by introducing an undefined "socialism" which shall solve present-day economic and social problems.

In considering the present resurgence of German nationalism, it must be remembered that the Germans were the last great people to achieve national unity, and that the centuries-long history of the small kingdoms and principalities which made up the socalled "Germanies" was the record not of a united people but of Prussians, Saxons, Bavarians, and others. Even after Bismarck had founded the Empire in 1871, local patriotism was still predominant. The self-conscious nationalism which marked imperial Germany in the decades before the World War must be regarded as the manifestation of a people politically united but not sufficiently unified to take its national patriotism for granted.

THE "MISSION" OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

The movement for German political unity which finally bore fruit in 1871 had been profoundly influenced by German intellectuals—historians, philosophers and writers. The poetry of the Romanticists and the theories of the state expounded by Kant and Hegel had had a large share in developing that spirit of patriotic nationalism which finally won the battle of Leipzig in 1813 and liberated Prussia. Furthermore, the philosopher Fichte, in his Reden an die deutsche Nation, had set forth an exalted conception of the character and mission of the Germans, and put forward the idea of a geographically isolated and economically self-sufficient community as the ideal nation. Hegel particularly had glorified the state, declaring that "the State is God on Earth!"1a He pictured mankind as progressing through the ages, steadily but unconsciously, toward the Germanic perfection of the nineteenth century. The German historians, meanwhile, developed the doctrine of the great "mission" of the

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^{1.} The methods by which the Nazi steam-roller has been able to sweep away all opposition, and the measures taken by the Hitler dictatorship to coordinate every phase of German life and set up a Nazi state on the ruins of the Weimar Republic will be discussed in a forthcoming issue of Foreign Policy Research.

¹a. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Vols. VIII-IX, sec. 258, p. 313.

German people and became leaders of nationalist thought. Histories lauding the Hohenzollerns, the glories of the German medieval period, German prowess in the crusades, and the deeds of the Teutonic knights contributed to nationalist fervor and did much to convince the Germans that Prussia and the Hohenzollerns were charged with a special "mission." The founding of the University of Berlin gave impetus to the development of glorious national history—past, present and future—supported by the Hegelian theory of the state. Most Prussian historians² shared Hegel's belief that civilization is spread only by war, and that the triumph of civilization demanded the suppression of races less capable of or less advanced in culture by nations of a higher order. War and the doctrine of force thus became the embodiment of progress to many Germans.3

THE "SCIENCE" OF RACIAL SUPERIORITY

In addition to this glorification of the state and of force, a new "science" of race aided German nationalists in explaining the superiority of the German race over all others. The publication in 1854 of a work by a Frenchman, Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, entitled Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines. did much to strengthen the cause of nationalism in Germany. The theories of Gobineau, moreover, furnish the "scientific" background for the anti-Semitism which forms a part of the intense Nazi nationalism. According to Gobineau, racial questions overshadow all other problems of history and hold the key to them. The inequality of races from whose fusion a people is formed explains the whole course of human destiny, Gobineau argued; and, further asserting the

inherent superiority of the "Aryan" race, he held that racial degeneration was the inevitable result of the mixture of Aryans with inferior races.4 This mystical glorification of Aryanism decisively influenced the growth of race vanity in Germany and the increasingly evident spirit of imperialism manifested after 1890.5 Gobineau paved the way for the work of an Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, whose Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts appeared in 1899. Chamberlain's main thesis was the assertion of the superiority of the Teuton family over all the other races of the world. "The awakening of the Teutonic peoples," he wrote, "to the consciousness of their all-important vocation and culture forms the turning point [in the history of Europe]."6 Chamberlain's book was widely read and discussed in Germany; it became a best-seller and was popular with the Kaiser, who is said to have financed the distribution of thousands of copies.

It is impossible to estimate the extent to which such works as those of Gobineau and Chamberlain actually influenced historical events, but they were doubtless of considerable importance in nourishing German national egotism.7 Mystical, abstract principles have always appealed to the German mind and have played a considerable rôle in German political life, as evidenced by the fact that all German parties in their official platforms outlined the broad philosophical bases of party dogma rather than policies on specific questions. Whether or not these theories had great influence on the German people before 1914, they established a most convenient foundation for Allied propaganda during the war and provided moral justification for the Versailles Treaty, particularly the "war guilt" article.

EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY

GERMANY'S POST-WAR DIFFICULTIES

It will be recalled, that the first post-war years in Germany were marked by the blackest disillusionment and discouragement. The Allied blockade, which was not lifted until after the signature of the peace treaty, increased the suffering of a people already starving and in the grip of revolution. The former German rulers had abdicated and the Kaiser had fled to Holland; the untried Social Democratic leaders who had taken over the government, were faced with the necessity not

Hankins, The Racial Basis of Civilization, cited, p. 51.
 H. S. Chamberlain, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (English translation by John Lees, London and New York, J. Lane, 1911), p. xv.

2. Duncker, Droysen, Leopold von Ranke, von Treitschke, von Sybel and Mommsen were the leading historians of this per-

only of saving the country from Bolshevism, but of setting up a new democratic state. Added to this was the dislocation entailed by the demobilization of the German army. It was only with the aid of former officers of the Imperial Army that this demobilization was carried through and the Left revolution was crushed, while officials of the old régime stuck to their posts and carried on the administration of the country. As a result, the Republic incurred a large debt to

J. Lane, 1911), p. xv.

7. Professor John Dewey has made the pertinent statement that "the philosopher sees movements, which might have passed away with change of circumstance as casually as they arose, acquire persistence and dignity because thought has taken cognizance of them and given them intellectual names. The witness of history is that to think in general and abstract terms is dangerous; it elevates ideas beyond situations in which they were born and charges them with we know not what menace for the future." (John Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics, New York, Holt, 1915, p. 12.)

suasion.
3. Mildred S. Werthelmer, The Pan-German League, 1890-1914
(New York, Longmans Green, 1924), p. 13 et seg.
4. Gobineau, Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines (Paris,

^{4.} Gobineau, Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines (Paris, 1884, 2 vols., translated by Adrian Collins, New York, 1915, p. xiv, 33); cf. also Werthelmer, The Pan-German League, 1890-1914, cited; Frank H. Hankins, The Racial Basis of Civilization, A Critique of the Nordic Doctrine (New York, Knopf, 1931), p. 33 et sea.

these officials and officers, despite the fact that many of them paid only lip-service to the new régime and, as time went on, became openly antagonistic.8 The seeds of counterrevolution were thus being planted even before the legal establishment of the Republic at Weimar on August 11, 1919. The new Republic also received a staggering blow in the Versailles Treaty. The German people, expecting a peace settlement based on Wilson's Fourteen Points, were thunderstruck by the terms of a treaty which imposed huge reparation demands, losses of German territory, occupation of the Rhineland and unilateral disarmament of the Reich. The moral condemnation expressed in Article 231 of the treaty, which was interpreted as placing the entire responsibility for the war on Germany and its allies, the Reich's loss of its colonies on the ground of German maladministration, and the demand that the so-called war criminals be turned over to the Allies for trial all seemed incomprehensible to the German people who had believed Wilson's pronouncements. As a result, the Weimar Republic was inextricably associated in popular opinion with the humiliation and disappointment engendered by the Versailles Treaty. The "stab-in-the-back legend" so carefully nurtured by the Nazis-according to which the Weimar coalition of Social Democrats. Catholic Centrists and Democrats which founded the Republic was held responsible for the German defeat—was thus strength-

During the years 1919-1923, while the struggling young Republic was endeavoring to consolidate its position and pull the Reich out of the chaos caused by war and revolution, its major task lay in the field of foreign affairs, and was concerned primarily with the reparation problem. This was the period of Allied ultimata, rejection of German counter-proposals, Allied sanctions in the form of occupation of more German cities, increasingly strict customs control and recurring abortive reparation conferences. Meanwhile the German mark sank deeper in the mire of inflation. In January 1923 the French and Belgians occupied the Ruhr, Germany countered with measures of passive resistance, and by autumn of that year the value of the mark had sunk to zero and the life savings of the German lower middle class were wiped out. Furthermore, the Rhineland separatist movement — supported by the French¹⁰ seemed for a time to threaten the very unity

Under these circumstances it was all too easy to win support for an extreme nationalist movement of protest. This was particularly true in Bavaria which, after the murder of Kurt Eisner in Munich in February 1919 and the relatively short-lived Soviet interregnum which followed, had become the headquarters of German monarchist and militarist reacti n. The brief Bavarian revolutionary episode had burned itself into the memory of the bourgeoisie; anti-Semitism has been strong in Bavaria ever since, for the conservatives blame all their troubles on the fact that Eisner and other revolutionaries were Jews. During the first post-war years, moreover, Germany was a veritable camp of so-called volunteer corps (Freikorps), composed of unemployed former officers and soldiers,11 many of which had their headquarters in Bavaria. These groups were extra-legal, and although ostensibly organized only for defense purposes, were most reactionary in character. Their influence may be traced through the Kapp Putsch in 1920, the murders of Erzberger and Rathenau, as well as the many other political murders which marked the early years of the Republic.12

It was in such troublous times that the National Socialist party had its obscure birth. The party grew out of a group of six men who met during 1919 in a small back room of a Munich café. Adolph Hitler joined the group as its seventh member and almost immediately became its leading personality. In the autumn of 1919 these men founded the National Socialist German Workers' party in Munich. Among the earliest members were some of the leaders of the volunteer corps, notably General von Epp and Captain Röhm. The latter, who had close connections with the Reichswehr, brought into the party many of his friends, both officers and men, with the result that up to 1923 these army men were apparently the backbone of the movement.13 Röhm is also reported to have been an important liaison officer between the volunteer corps and the militarist clubs and groups (Wehrverbände), which apparently furnished many recruits for the Reichswehr as well as for the Nazis. Meanwhile, Hitler by tireless speechmaking gained further supporters, and by the end of 1920 his party had 3,000 members; by November 1923 there were 5,000 paying members of the National Socialist party. 14

HITLER'S BEER HALL PUTSCH

Hitler and his party first came into the limelight in 1923. By that time Hitler had attracted the attention of General Ludendorff

^{8.} Walter Gerhart, Um des Reiches Zukunft (Freiburg i/Br., Herder, 1932), p. 46 et seq.; Edgar Ansell Mowrer, Germany Puts the Clock Back (New York, Morrow, 1933), p. 17 et seq. 9. Dolchstoss Legende.
10. G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, Arrowsmith, 1930), passim.

^{11.} The Ehrhardt Brigade, the Baltic Defense Corps, the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, the Black Reichswehr, etc.

12. Mildred S. Wertheimer, "The Hitler Movement in Germany," Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, January 21, 1931.

13. Konrad Heiden, Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus

Heiden, Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus (Berlin, Rowohlt, 1932), p. 12 et seq. 14. Ibid., p. 44, 143.

and the latter's nationalist followers. crisis caused by the occupation of the Ruhr and the attendant growth of ultra-nationalist sentiment in Germany seemed to offer the psychological moment for Hitler's Putsch. On November 9, 1923 the combined forces of Hitler and Ludendorff attempted a coup d'état in Munich under Hitler's leadership, but it missed fire entirely. The attempt has gone down in history as the Beer-Hall Putsch.

As a result of this attempted coup, Hitler was arrested and on April 1, 1924 was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for treason. During his imprisonment, his followers had, against his will, joined forces with another extremist group — the German People's Freedom party (Deutsch-Völkische Freiheitspartei)—which managed to elect 32 members of the Reichstag at the general election on May 4, 1924. Hitler was released at the end of 1924 and at once renewed his political activity. In February 1925 he reorganized the National Socialist party, and assumed leadership over both this party and the German People's Freedom party.

After the stabilization of the mark, Germany enjoyed a period of comparative recovery and prosperity from 1924 to 1928, although even then there was considerable unemployment.15 It was during this period that the great influx of foreign loans to Germany took place. Furthermore, this was the era of improved international relations, the Dawes Plan, Locarno, of Germany's entrance into the League of Nations, and the partial evacuation of the Rhineland. The domestic political situation was reflected in the results of the 1928 Reichstag election, when the moderate Social Democratic party made large gains, the middle bourgeois groups held their own fairly well, and the Communists showed only a small though steady growth. The Nationalists, however, lost 30 seats and the Nazis, who in the December 1924 election had dropped from 32 to 14, elected only 12 deputies in 1928.16

These four years of comparatively prosperous times proved to be merely a lull before the storm. German economic improvement, which was part of prevailing world prosperity had, however, been made possible largely by the great amounts of foreign capital, much of it borrowed at short-term, which had not only helped create an illusion of prosperity, but made it possible for the Reich to meet and transfer its reparation obligations. Nevertheless, Germany's repara-

D. 545.

tion creditors, meeting in Paris early in 1929, drafted the Young Plan which replaced the Dawes Plan of 1924. The new arrangement was predicated on the continuation and expansion of world prosperity, which alone could assure the Reich a favorable trade balance sufficient to meet its obligations under The world depression, the Young Plan. which began even before the Young Plan had gone into effect, nullified the financial advantages which the Reich expected to derive from the plan, and eventually caused its demise for all practical purposes. German acceptance of the Young Plan, however, had freed the Rhineland from foreign occupation five years before the date stipulated in the Versailles Treaty. But when the evacuation of the Rhineland took place in June 1930, Germany was already in the grip of the depression. As a result, the salutary effects expected from the Rhineland liberation were not realized. On the contrary, the Hitler movement, of which little had been heard during the preceding years of relative prosperity, suddenly came once more into the limelight.

Hitler had cooperated with the Nationalist leader, Hugenberg, in the plebiscite on the Young Plan which was held late in 1929. On November 25, at the first poll, 4,135,300 votes were cast by Nazis and Nationalists, or only .02 per cent more than the 10 per cent of qualified voters necessary to force the Reichstag to introduce a bill against the Young Plan. The Reichstag rejected this bill on November 29 by an overwhelming majority and, when the actual plebiscite took place on December 22, only 5,825,082 votes, or less than one-third of the number necessary to prevent acceptance of the Young Plan, were cast by the combined forces of Hitler and Hugenberg.17

ECONOMIC DEPRESSION FOSTERS NATIONAL SOCIALISM

The fact that the Nazis and Nationalists together polled less than six million votes at the end of 1929 makes the success of Hitler at the Reichstag election on September 14, 1930 the more striking. Less than a year after the Young Plan plebiscite, the Nazis alone rolled up 6,401,210 votes and elected 107 members of the Reichstag. The Hugenberg Nationalists received only 2,458,497 votes, or slightly more than half of their 1928 following. The Nazi landslide had begun.

There were three principal causes for the tremendous Nazi increase. In the first place. the deepening depression had already thrown three million people out of work by Septem-

^{15.} In January 1924 there were 1,900,000 unemployed in Ger-15. In January 1924 there were 1,900,000 unemployed in Germany; in January 1926, 2,221,000 were out of work. Even in the boom year 1928, there were 1,862,000 unemployed in January. (Institut für Konjunkturforschung, Kurven und Zahlen in Deutschland, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1932, p. 8; also Mildred S. Wertheimer, "The Financial Crisis in Germany," Foreign Policy Reports, March 2, 1932.)

16. Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1931, p. 545

^{17.} Cf. Cuno Horkenbach, Das deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute (Berlin, Verlag für Presse, Wirtschaft und Politik, 1930), p. 292 et seq. The popular vote polled by the Hugenberg Nationalists in May 1928, the last election before the plebiscite, was 4,380,200. The Nazis had polled only 809,000 at that election.

ber 1930.18 Second, the inner political difficulties in the Reich created an increasing distrust and antipathy for the Republic and parliamentary government. The Reichstag, with its multiplicity of parties, seemed incapable of coping with the complex economic and financial problems confronting the country,19 while the situation of the German people grew progressively worse. Both of these factors contributed to the third cause of Nazi growth—the success of the untiring agitation of the Hitlerites themselves. Between the autumn of 1929 and September 1930, the National Socialists staged meeting after meeting;20 during the fortnight before the September elections, the Völkische Beobachter, official organ of the party, listed some 3,300 meetings;21 many of these were held in small out-of-the-way villages, where few if any political gatherings had been held Hitler's stalwarts, clad in their brown uniforms, toured the countryside in trucks, unceasingly addressing the peasants and farm workers. In many small villages these meetings, well advertised beforehand, were much like a traveling circus to the inhabitants. The stage management of all Nazi gatherings has been dramatic in the extreme. Flags, bands, the marching of uniformed men appealed to a people which react en masse to the spectacular, especially in a Republic singularly devoid of colorful ceremonies which had succeeded an Empire with all its pomp and circumstance of kings, princes, courts and army.

THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PROGRAM

The Nazi agitation, from first to last, was based on denunciation of the Versailles "dic-' the Republic, its leaders, the Jews, the "Marxists," and the so-called "System." It followed Hitler's theories, expressed in his autobiography, that in propaganda the end justifies the means, and that all agitation should be directed solely to influence the masses. "Propaganda is not science," wrote Hitler, and while attempting to prove certain facts to the masses, "the appeal must be directed to the emotions and only in a very qualified manner to so-called intelligence."22 The program of the party was sufficiently vague to allow Hitlerite orators to promise help to everyone, adjusting their remarks to suit their audiences. The Third Reich, which the Nazis told their followers would replace the hated Republic, appeared to many harrassed Germans like the promised land, and Hitler himself became the Messiah of this new order.

Negative propaganda was the cornerstone of all Nazi agitation. On the more positive side, stands the official program of the party which, vague and contradictory as it appears, must be considered as a possible guide to Nazi policy now that Hitler has taken complete control of the Reich. This program, which contains twenty-five points, was written by Gottfried Feder²³ in February 1920, and is prefaced by the following statement: "The program of the party is a program dedicated to the present (Zeitprogramm)." After the aims set forth in the present pro
18. Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1931, Graph VII.

gram have been achieved, "the leaders decline to set themselves new goals which can only serve to make possible the continuation of the party by means of artifically heightened dissatisfaction among the masses." The official commentary published in the 1932 edition of the program contains the following further statement:

"We refuse to act as other parties do and, for reasons of opportunism, adapt our program to meet so-called conditions. We will on the contrary adapt conditions to square with our program in that we will master these conditions." 24

THE TWENTY-FIVE POINTS

The Twenty-Five Points, which are thus declared unalterable, are as follows:

- I. We demand the union of all Germans by the right of self-determination of peoples, in one great Germany.
- II. We demand the equality of the German people with all other nations and the abrogation of the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.
- III. We demand land and territory (colonies) sufficient for the feeding of our people and for settlement by our surplus population.
- IV. Only a member of our own people (Volksgenosse) may be a citizen (Staatsbürger). Our own people are only those of German blood without reference to confession. Therefore, no Jew may be a member of our people.
- V. He who is not a citizen may live in Germany only as a guest and must be governed by laws regulating foreigners.
- VI. Only citizens may decide on the leadership and laws of the State. Therefore, we demand that every public office, no matter of what sort, whether in the Reich, the States or the Communes, shall be filled only by citizens.

We fight against the corrupting parliamentary system which fills positions with people chosen only for their party politics without reference to character or ability.

VII. We demand that the State be obliged to provide working and living possibilities for its citizens. If it is not possible to feed the entire

19. Mildred S. Wertheimer, "The Significance of the German Elections," September 3, 1930.

^{20.} Heiden, Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, cited, p. 277 et seq.
21. Völkische Beobachter, September 1-13, 1930, inclusive.
22. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich, Eher Verlag, 1930), p. 195 et seq. This was first published in 1924. At present German libraries are compelled to have several copies of this

book on their shelves.

23. Herr Feder was appointed Under-Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Economics on June 29, 1933. New York Times, June 30, 1933.

^{24.} This statement and the Twenty-Five Points, as well as the following analysis of the program, are taken from the party's official program: Gottfried Feder, Das Programm der N.S.D.A.P. und seine Weltanschaulichen Grundgedanken (Munich, Verlag Frz. Eher Nachf. G.m.b.H., 1932).

population of the State, all members of foreign nations (non-citizens) must be expelled from the

Reich at once.

VIII. All further immigration of non-Germans must be stopped. We demand that all non-Germans who have immigrated to Germany since August 2, 1914 shall be ousted from the Reich.

IX. All citizens must have the same rights and

duties.

X. It must be the primary duty of every citizen to engage in productive work, whether in physical or intellectual fields. The activities of individuals must not be such as to conflict with the general interest but, on the contrary, must be for the common good.

THEREFORE WE DEMAND:

XI. Abolition of all income acquired without work or trouble; DESTRUCTION OF THE SLAVERY TO INTEREST (ZINSKNECHT-

SCHAFT).

XII. Because of the tremendous sacrifice in goods and blood which every war demands of the people, personal enrichment through war must be branded as a crime against the people. mand, therefore, complete confiscation of all war profits.

XIII. We demand the nationalization of all

trusts

XIV. We demand distribution of the profits

of large industries.

XV. We demand an increase on a large scale

in care for the aged.

XVI. We demand the building-up of a healthy middle class and its preservation; we demand immediate communalization of large department stores and further, that they be rented at moderate prices to small shop-keepers; the strictest control of all shop-keepers in their sales to the Reich, the States and the Communes.

XVII. We demand agrarian reform consistent

with our national needs; the passage of a law to expropriate without compensation land which is to be used for common purposes; the abolition of in-

be used for common purposes; the abolition of interest on land debts (Bodenzinsen) and of all speculation in land values. The expeculation in land values are those people who through their activities harm the common welfare. Dangerous criminals, usurers, profiteers, etc., must be punished with death without regard to religion or race.

YIY We demand a Garman common law as

XIX. We demand a German common law as a substitute for the Roman law which serves the

materialistic world-order.

XX. To make it possible for every hard-working and capable German to secure a higher education and therefore the opportunity of attaining a leading position, the State has the responsibility of providing for a fundamental extension of our common educational system. The plans of instruction of all institutions of learning must correspond to the demands of practical life. An understanding of the theory of the State must be taught to the children at the earliest possible age. We demand special education at state expense of

gifted children of poor parents, without regard to their profession or position.

XXI. The State must care for the improvement of the health of the people by protection of mother and child, by forbidding child labor, by making laws for the development of sport and

gymnastics in order to build up the bodies of its citizens and by the most generous support of all clubs which work toward building up the bodies of the youth of the nation.

XXII. We demand the abolition of the mer-

cenary army and the development of a people's

We demand a legal (gesetzlich) battle against the conscious political lies and their propagation in the press. In order to make possible

the creation of a German press, we demand that:
a. All editors and workers on newspapers which appear in the German language

must be citizens.

b. Non-German newspapers require the specific permission of the State for publica-tion. They may not be printed in the

German language.

c. Any financial participation or influence in a German newspaper is to be forbidden by law and punished by confiscation of the paper as well as by the immediate expulsion from the Reich of the non-German in question.

Newspapers which work against the common good are to be prohibited.

We demand laws against tendencies in art and literature which have a bad influence on our life as a people, and the closing of institutions which

conflict with this demand.

XXIV. We demand freedom for all religious sects in the State in so far as they do not en-danger the State or work against the customs and morals of the German race. The party as such represents the point of view of a positive Christianity without binding itself to any particular confession. It fights the spirit of Jewish materialism in us and outside us and is convinced that a lasting convalescence of our people can only take place from the inner conviction that "common welfare comes before individual welfare."

XXV. In order to carry out all of this program, we demand the creation of a strong central authority in the Reich; unqualified authority of the political central parliament over the entire Reich and its organizations; the creation of professional chambers [like Soviets] to carry out the laws promulgated by the Reich in the several Federal States.

The leaders of the party promise to work ruthlessly for the fulfillment of the above [Twenty-Five] Points even, if necessary, to the extent of staking their lives for the program.

OFFICIAL NAZI INTERPRETATION

The official commentary on the Twenty-Five Points gives some further indication of the meaning of the program, declaring that the most important tenets in the Nazi program are those specifying that "the common welfare comes before individual welfare," and that "slavery to interest" must be abolished. The Nazi racial theories and anti-Semitism, however, form a connecting link between these apparently unrelated demands and the entire Nazi program as well. Thus the aim of the Hitlerites is said to be the creation of order out of the chaos caused by "a government fighting against the people, party against party, parliament against government, worker against employer, consumer against producer," with resulting "impoverishment, graft and betrayal." The cause of this state of affairs is the shattered and false spiritual foundations of society brought about by Marxists, capitalists, industrialists

^{25.} An "explanation" of this section of the program was added by Hitler on April 13, 1928, as follows: "In reply to the lying expositions of Point XVII of the program of the National Socialist party which our opponents have made, the following declaration is necessary. Since the National Socialist party stands firmly for the principle of private property, it is self-evident that the passage 'to expropriate without compensation' can only apply to the creation of laws concerning land which has been illegally acquired or which has not been administered according to the common good and which, therefore, should be expropriated when necessary. Such action is directed in the first place against Jewish companies engaged in land speculation."

and public leaders, all of whom are motivated by the same individualist philosophy: personal individual aggrandizement. The Jews are the world enemy, responsible not only for Marxism but for large capitalism, for they hold the whip hand over the people in the form of interest on capital. Therefore, the Nazis contend, the "slavery to interest" must be broken although the means by which this policy is to be carried out are not indicated.

Of primary importance in overcoming both "individualistic materialism" and "interest slavery" is the settlement of the Jewish question which is described as "the emotional foundation of the National Socialist movement." According to Nazi ideology, the Jewish "materialistic spirit" is the root of all evil. The Nazis envisage the struggle against this spirit as a battle between two philosophies: "the elemental, creative, productive spirit of the Aryans, firmly rooted in the earth; and the ravaging, rootless, self-seeking spirit of the Jews." Germany, says the Hitlerites, must be the home of the Germans and not the abiding place of "Jews, Russians (Communists), and Social Democrats who recognize no fatherland." In this statement is contained the entire Nazi foreign policy, the demand for political freedom of the Reich, all racial-political demands and citizenship requirements.

MAIN PRINCIPLES OF NAZI FOREIGN POLICY

The primary object of Nazi foreign policy is to liberate Germany from "political and economic slavery."26 Some indication of the measures by which this is to be achieved is given in Hitler's autobiography. Germany, he declares, must strengthen its position as a Continental power; this it can do only through alliances with Great Britain and Italy. France is the arch-enemy of Germany, and it is primarily against the French that Germany must fight. In his book Hitler envisages two wars with the aid of Great Britain and Italy—one against France and one against Russia. The fact that England does not seem particularly anxious to ally itself with Germany, Hitler ascribes to the influence of "international Jews," stating that in this "freest democracy [England] the Jews today dictate by the roundabout method of influencing public opinion, in a fashion which is practically unlimited. There is in England, almost uninterrupted cooperation between the representatives of the British state and the pioneer workers for a Jewish world-dictatorship."²⁷ As for Russia, Hitler contends that Germany needs territory on which

its surplus population can settle; that territory is available only in the East, and therefore Germany must make war on Russia to obtain land.

Further light on Nazi aims in foreign policy is shed by the writings of Alfred Rosenberg, now head of the so-called foreign affairs section of the National Socialist party. Rosenberg proclaims that the Nazis desire "no Mitteleuropa without racial and national differences such as Naumann dreamed of, no Franco-Jewish Pan-Europa. A Nordic Europe is the solution of the future, together with a German *Mitteleuropa*. Germany as a racial and national state from Strasburg to Memel, from Eupen to Prague and Laibach, as the central power of the continent, as a guarantee for the South and Southeast. The Scandinavian states and Finland as a second alliance to guarantee the Northeast; and Great Britain as a guarantee in the West and overseas necessary in the interest of the Nordic race."28

The program commentary also contains further illuminating remarks regarding Nazi foreign policy. Thus in demanding "a selfsufficient national state comprising all Germans," Herr Feder, the official commentator, states that "all people of German blood, whether they live under Danish, Polish, Czech, Italian or French rule, must be united in a German Reich." And he adds: "We will not renounce a single German in Sudeten,28a in Alsace-Lorraine, in Poland, in the League of Nations' colony Austria, or in the succession states of old Austria." Moreover, in foreign policy in general, the Nazis' demand that the "dust of the Foreign Office must be swept out with an iron broom. There must be an end to the toadying of the Erzbergers and Stresemanns to foreigners and we shall soon see how a strong representation of German interests abroad will receive proper respect, and how German wishes will gain such respect and consideration instead of kicks and blows."

NAZI RACIAL POLICIES

At home, however, the German Reich, comprising all Germans, is to be purely Teutonic. Nazi anti-Semitism is a racial and not a religious matter. It is based on the theory that no Jew is a German, regardless of how many centuries he and his ancestors may have lived in the Reich. Therefore, according to the Nazis, no Jew may be a German citizen. As a corollary, all Jews must be excluded from responsible positions in German public life.

^{26.} Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch, 1931 (Hrsg. unter Mitwirkung der Reichsleitung der N.S.D.A.P., 5th year (Munich, Frz. Eher Nachf., 1931), p. 29.

^{27.} Hitler, Mein Kampf, cited, p. 721; for his foreign policy, cf. p. 687-758.

^{28.} Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des 20 Jahrhunderts, Eine Wertung der seelisch-geistigen Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit (Munich, Hoheneichen-Verlag, 1930), p. 602. In a speech at Münster on May 13, 1933, Vice Chancellor von Papen attacked pacificism and declared that "the battlefield is for a man what motherhood is for a woman." New York Times, May 14, 1933.

²⁸a. A mountain district in Prussia, Saxony, Silesia and Czechoslovakia.

The official program commentary states in this connection:

"This demand is so much a matter of course to us Nazis that it requires no amplification. A person who regards Jews as 'German citizens of Jewish faith' and not as a foreign race, a strictly exclusive people of decidedly parasitic character, cannot understand the essentials of our demands."

Hitler himself may be listed as the primary source of Nazi anti-Semitism, and his autobiography is illuminating on this point. According to his own account, when he went from his childhood home in Linz to Vienna as a young man, he had already become an ardent nationalist, hating the Austro-Hungarian Empire because it was an empire of nationalities and not a national empire.29 In Vienna he appears eventually to have found a job in the building trades, and finally to have become a draughtsman. He was asked to join the Social Democratic party but refused. After listening to his fellow-workers for a time, he argued with them and finally appears to have opposed them so hotly that he was forced to leave his job. This happened several times and, as a result, Hitler lived in great poverty for a number of years. This may explain in part his intense anti-Marxian feeling as well as his anti-Semitism.30 Since some of the Socialist leaders were Jews, to Hitler the whole Socialist movement was, and is, a plot of the international Jews to gain control of the workers.

During the last decade of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth century, Austria-Hungary was a hotbed of anti-Semitism. Although by the time Hitler reached Vienna the movement, which had been largely political, was on the wane, the prestige of the pan-German leader, Ritter von Schoenerer, and of the notoriously anti-Semitic Mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger, was still great.31 Hitler was influenced by the views of both Schoenerer and Lueger,32 although he apparently did not always agree with their political tactics. It was during his Vienna days, also, that Hitler for the first time saw a Galician Jew in caftan and side curls. His reactions, written many years later, are significant. He noted:

"Once while I was going through the inner city I came suddenly upon an apparition in a long caftan with black curls. Is this also a Jew? was my first thought. Jews in Linz had not looked like that. I observed the man, furtive and stealthy, and the longer I stared at this foreign face and regarded it feature by feature, the more the question crystallized itself in my mind in another form: Is this a German as well?" 33

Thus, even before the war, Hitler was a confirmed anti-Semite. After the war, when

the National Socialist party was already active in Munich, Hitler met Alfred Rosenberg, the present head of the so-called Nazi Foreign Affairs Bureau. It was apparently Rosenberg's influence which gave Hitler's anti-Semitism its "Black Hundred" accession to power, for Rosenberg, although of German ancestry, was born in Reval (Estonia); he spent the war years in Russia as a student and, like many other Russian emigrés, fled to Munich in 1919.34

BASES OF GERMAN ANTI-SEMITISM

It cannot be denied, however, that there had been considerable anti-Semitism in Germany even before Hitler's advent, and on several occasions feeling against the Jews reached large proportions. This was particularly the case during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. Anti-Semitism was started by a series of financial scandals involving prominent Jews as well as important Gentile aristocrats after the panic of 1873, which had resulted from wild speculation due to the rapid payment of the large French war indemnity. The publication at this time of a pamphlet entitled Der Sieg des Judentums über das Germanentum by an obscure journalist, Wilhelm Marr, fell on fer-Marr was imbued with Hegel's tile soil. theory of nationality—namely that the nation should be a unit compromising individuals speaking the same language and of the same racial origin, and demanding the elimination of all elements which could not be reduced to the so-called national type. The Jews, according to Marr, were of course an element incapable of such standardization. The exigencies of German party politics added to the financial difficulties of the time, fed the flame of this new pseudo-scientific anti-Semitism which was based not on religious but on racial grounds. Bismarck's breach with the National Liberal party in 1879 was followed by a tremendous growth of feeling against the Jews, which led to the formation of a definitely anti-Semitic political group the Christian Socialist party — under the leadership of Adolf Stöcker, the court While Stöcker's so-called Chrispreacher. tian Socialism had appealed to German conservative elements, a more popular leader named Ahlwardt, whose name was connected with many unsavory scandals, had gained a considerable hold on the masses as an anti-Semitic agitator. Ahlwardt's propaganda was apparently "wild, unscrupulous and fullblooded," and a prosecution and conviction for libel only seemed to increase his influence. Although eventually all this agitation died

^{29.} Mein Kampf, p. 8 et seq. Nationalitätenstaat as opposed to Nationalstaat.

^{30.} Ibid., p. 40 et seq.

^{31.} Lucien Wolf, "Anti-Semitism," Encyclopedia Britannica (11th Ed., New York, 1910), p. 141 et seq.

^{32.} Mein Kampf, cited, p. 105 et seq.

^{33.} Ibid., p. 59.

³³a. The most reactionary elements in Tsarist Russia.

^{34.} Heiden, Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, cited, p. 47.

down, there can be no doubt that the wave of anti-Semitism left its mark on the German

people.35

The anti-Semitic sections of the National Socialist program were thus not an entirely new thing in German politics. Furthermore, Nazi anti-Semitism offered the German people a welcome scapegoat on which to blame all their hardships since the war. Moreover, German youth, which today forms so important a section of Hitler's followers, was subjected to intense anti-Semitic propaganda almost from the beginning of its political consciousness.

COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT

YOUTH SWAYED BY HITLERISM

The National Socialist movement is to a large extent a youth movement. The German birthrate during the fifteen years before the war was particularly high³⁶ and the children born during that period, now adults between the ages of 20 and 30, have undergone the severest hardships. First the war, with its attendant lack of proper food, lax discipline at school and at home, and overwrought emotional state; then the uncertainty of the Revolution and hunger intensified by the blockade. Later, at the time when youth should have been learning the value of money, came the inflation. Finally, when they were grown and ready to work, no jobs were available. As a result, these young people became completely disillusioned, and lost all hope regarding their future. Those young people who had any international sentiments became Communists; the large majority, attracted by the pomp and circumstance with which the Hitler movement surrounded itself, became National Socialists. Hot-headed and impulsive, these young Germans are tremendously idealistic. Since they had nothing to do with the war, they feel intensely that there is no reason why they themselves, and their children and grandchildren after them, should pay for it, and they have been told unceasingly that their Fatherland was humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles and betrayed into signing it. They have lost faith in their elders who, they believe, have made a complete failure of life: now it is their turn to set the world right and Hitler is their prophet.37

Among the older generation, the Nazi followers have come very largely from the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Many small white-collar people whose businesses have been completely disrupted by the depression, but who felt that it would degrade them to vote for one of the Left parties, turned National Socialist. This tendency was apparent also among farmers and agricultural workers, where Nazi propaganda was especially active. Finally, many people belonging to what has been

called in the Reich the "non-voters' party"—people who had never voted before—went to the polls in the four Reichstag elections between 1930 and 1933 and voted for Hitler. Aroused by the Nazi propaganda, and utterly disillusioned with the older parties which apparently had been unable to help them out of their difficulties, these people also saw in Hitler their last hope.

Support of Hitler by the bourgeoisie and the younger generation caused a steady decline in all parties of the German Right except the Nazis, whose gains were correspondingly large. The Catholic parties managed to hold their own fairly well, while on the Left, the moderate Social Democrats declined somewhat, losing some supporters to the Communists and failing to attract their proportion of the young workers who would normally have filled the Socialist ranks. The age distribution of the Social Democratic, Communist and Nazi deputies elected to the 1930 Reichstag as shown in the following table illustrates this situation:³⁸

Age	Democrats	Nazis	Communists	
Over 70	1		1	
50-70	73	12	1	
40-50	49	21	20	
30-40	20	63	47	
Under 30		9	8	

The discipline of the older German workers, however, even at the last elections on March 5, 1933, was demonstrated by the fact that at that poll, despite terror and suppression, the Socialists elected 120 Reichstag deputies, as compared with 121 at the previous election, while the Communists dropped from 100 to 81.

HITLER SUPPORTED BY INDUSTRIALISTS AND JUNKERS

Paradoxically, the political discipline of the German workers during the whole period of the Republic proved of ultimate advantage to the Nazis: many important German industrialists and landowners saw in Hitler a means by which to crush organized German labor and the power of the trade unions, and thus free themselves from the expensive social insurances, fixed wage scales and compulsory labor arbitration. These magnates regarded the Nazis as the best bulwark against Socialism and Communism, despite the vague socialistic theories of the Hitlerites

^{35.} For a summary of anti-Semitism in Germany, cf. Wolf, "Anti-Semitism," cited, p. 135 et seq.

^{36.} Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1981, p. li.

p. 11.

37. Hanns Heinz Ewers, Horst Wessel (Berlin, J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachf., 1933). This biography of the young Nazi "martyr," sympathetically written, attempts to portray the idealism and "pure patriotic feeling" of Hitler's young storm troopers.

^{38.} Cf. Sigmund Neumann, Die deutschen Parteien (Berlin, Junker and Dünnhaupt, 1932), p. 134. By 1933 this age distribution was even more marked.

which they did not take seriously. As a result, many big industrialists gave the Nazis financial assistance,39 and the latter were enabled not only to carry on expensive propaganda campaigns, but also to support their increasingly powerful private army, the Storm Troops (Sturm Abteilung-S.A.) and the picked men who form the so-called Schutzstaffel-S.S., a sort of party police and bodyguard of the Nazi leaders. For more than two years there was virtual civil war in the Reich, while the Nazi private army strove for "control of the streets" against the Republican Reichsbanner and the Communists.41

While the industrialists supported Hitler financially in order to gain the whip hand over German labor, the moderate Social Democrats were endeavoring to preserve the forms of the Republic which they had founded. As a result, at grave cost to their Socialist principles, but hoping that the Nazi tide could be turned by constitutional means, the Social Democrats tolerated and supported Dr. Brüning from September 1930 until he was forced out by President von Hindenburg in May 1932. Even after von Papen's coup d'état in Prussia on July 20, 1932, which was directed primarily against the Socialists, the latter did not retaliate by resort to their most potent weapon—the general strike. Instead, the party exhorted its followers to show the Papen government at the polls on July 31 that German democracy could not be trampled on.42 The election on that date, however, resulted in continued Socialist losses, while the Communists gained in strength. Three months later, at the November 6, 1932 election, the same trend was evident, although the Communist gain was considerably larger than the Socialist loss.

The death knell of German democracy. however, had already been sounded. General von Schleicher had succeeded von Papen as head of a new presidial government on December 2; his brief Chancellorship, which lasted only 57 days, was marked by attempts to conciliate the trade unions and win the confidence of both Right and Left. The General was unable to induce the Nazis to accept governmental responsibility, and the industrialists and Junkers, interested primarily in maintaining their influence and in crushing Socialism and Communism, lost all confidence in this conciliatory Chancellor. Schleicher was overthrown on January 28, 1933, apparently as a result of political intrigues of the sort in which he himself was a past master. It is reported that Herr von Papen, smarting at his loss of the Chancellorship in November 1932, was determined to oust von Schleicher. Von Papen had access to President von Hindenburg, while Schleicher-although Chancellor-did not have the full confidence of the old Field Marshal. Thus Papen and his Nationalist friends, who during January 1933 had been in close touch with Hitler, were able to convince the President that Schleicher must be dismissed. Rumors of an impending Reichswehr Putsch to aid Schleicher apparently were reported to von Hindenburg, and the latter consequently refused Schleicher's request for full powers; the General resigned on January 28. The Nationalist industrialists and Junkers, who by these devious methods had rid themselves of the "social Chancellor," strongly supported the Hitler Cabinet of "national concentration" which took power on January 30, fully expecting to control and make use of the Nazis for their own ends. Their failure is one of the ironies of history.43

THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION

Hitler's accession to power on January 30, 1933 as Chancellor of Germany marks the beginning of the so-called National Revolution. Despite the fact that the new government was supposedly a coalition of Hitlerites and Nationalists, containing only three Nazi Ministers, it soon became apparent that the latter were the driving force in the Cabinet. Backed by a party organization which covered every phase of German life and in reality constituted a state within a state,44 and uninhibited by scruples of any sort, the Nazis

were able to dominate the government completely and put through the revolution. Their task was facilitated not only by Hitler's Chancellorship but also by the fact that his lieutenants, Frick and Goering, were respectively Reich and Prussian Ministers of the Interior, and thus controlled the police in the entire country. Furthermore, the non-Nazi members of the Hitler government were apparently willing that the major share of the election campaign preparatory to the March 5 Reichstag poll should be carried on by the Nazis, who were universally recognized as excelling in propaganda of this sort. The Nationalists hoped thus to consolidate their own position and ride to power, as it were, on the shoulders of the Hitlerites.

"Nazi Germany." The Round Table (London), June 1983,

^{39.} Heiden, Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, cited, p. 144 et seq., Richard Lewinson (Morus), Das Geld in der Politik (Berlin, Fischer Verlag, 1930) p. 146 et seq.; Mowrer, Germany Puts the Clock Back, cited, p. 142 et seq.
40. It has been estimated that by the beginning of 1933, when Hitler came to power, the Nazl private army comprised between five and six hundred thousand men.
41. The Nazi S.A. also had frequent encounters with the Nationalist Stahlhelm, the veterans' association, although the main rlots were between the S.A. and the Communists.
42. Wertheimer, "Hitler and the German Political Crisis," cited.

cited.

For party organization, direction, local groups in and outside the Reich, press organs, insurance of S. A. troopers, Hitler youth organizations, Nazi professional groups, including teachers, doctors, lawyers, students and women, cf. Nationalteachers, doctors, lawyers, students and women, cozialistisches Jahrbuch, 1931, cited, p. 129 et seq.

The campaign as directed by the Nazis was used to stir up an immense Communist scare in the Reich, culminating in the burning of the Reichstag building on the night of February 27 by alleged Communists. This incident gave the Nazis an opportunity to effect complete suppression of Socialist and Communist election meetings and press, to arrest the Communist leaders, to institute a drastic censorship, and to abolish all forms of personal liberty in general. A decree proclaimed by President von Hindenburg on February 28, 1933 rescinded until further notice all the articles of the Weimar Constitution providing for liberty of the person; freedom of opinion, including freedom of the press; right of assembly; secrecy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication; inviolability of dwellings; and sanctity of private property. Furthermore, under this decree the Reich government was given the right to enforce its provisions in the federal states, and the penalties for infraction were made very severe. The death sentence, life or long imprisonment were specified for particular crimes including high treason, poisoning, arson, conspiracy against the life of the Reich President, the members of the Reich government or Reich Commissioners. execution of the decree was placed entirely in the hands of the police, with no appeal.45 As a result of this decree and of Nazi terrorism, the opposition was prevented from carrying on its campaign. The actual election, however, apparently took place without incident, although the atmosphere throughout the Reich was tense in the extreme. The following table gives the results of the voting on March 5, as well as the returns in the three previous elections, thus presenting a complete picture of the rise of the Nazis.46

	Mar. 5, 1933	Nov. 6, 1932	July 31,	Sept. 14, 1930
Parties	Seats	Seats	S_{cats}	Seats
National Socialist	288	196	230	107
German National				
People's*	52	51	37	41
German People's	2	11	7	30
Economic	•••••	1	2	23
Other Parties	7	12	9	55
Catholic Center	74	70	75	68
Bavarian People's	18	20	22	19
State	5	2	4	14
Social Democratic	120	121	133	143
Communist	81	100	89	77
Totals	647	584	608	577

^{*}The German National People's party fought the March 1933 election under the designation Schwarz-Weiss-Rote-Front-Black-White-Red Front.

Thus the Nazis, with 44 per cent of the total vote, and their Nationalist colleagues in the government, who polled 8 per cent, achieved a working majority of the German electorate on March 5. The so-called National Revolution which followed the election must be characterized, however, as the consolidation of complete Nazi control of the Reich.

Youth and the German bourgeoisie under Hitler's leadership now rule supreme in Germany. The combination of youthful energy and ardor directed by older men, the major portion of whose experience was gained in the World War, the post-war campaigns against the Bolsheviks in the Baltic provinces and the illegal activities of the many so-called volunteer corps (Freikorps) in Germany during the troubled years between 1920 and 1924 has given the Revolution its tone. The very vagueness of the official program on which this Revolution was based makes pertinent the question-what do the "revolutionaries" really want?

The ideal toward which the Nazis are striving is the setting up of the "totalitarian state" (Totalstaat) in which there will be only one party, the National Socialist, and no classes of society. This state is based on the principle of leadership—dictatorship in practice—and the people are merely to follow their leaders. The entire old "system" of parliamentary government is to be abolished. To this end, Jewish influence is to be exterminated in all branches of German life and culture. In this "totalitarian state," moreover, the ideal is standardization, with emphasis on assistance to small private enterprise. trend of Nazi economics is away from large, monopolistic concerns. Furthermore, the Nazis favor complete economic self-sufficiency (Autarchy) for the Reich, with intensive cultivation of the home market. Inevitably such a policy must lead to a lower standard of living in Germany, but a classless state founded on small agricultural holdings would fit into the Nazi ideal of comradeship in work for all. Individualism and the rights of the individual have no place in the Nazi scheme of things; it is the so-called community of the people alone (Volksgemeinschaft) which matters. Furthermore, the new state is to be primarily a male affair, for women are to be removed from industry as far as possible and relegated to the home and the kitchen. Thus the double purpose is supposedly served of providing more jobs for men and increasing the German birthrate which has fallen sharply since the war. All these measures are envisaged by the Nazis as the means of making Germany a great power again, securing its "equality" with other nations, freeing it from the "fetters" of the peace settlement, and eventually regaining the territory and population lost at the end of the World War.

^{45.} For text of the decree, cf. Der Zeitspiegel, March 19, 1933. The articles of the Constitution which have been rescinded are: 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153.

46. Der Zeitspiegel, March 19, 1933; Der Heimatdienst, Jahrgang XII, No. 16, August 2, 1932; Frankfurter Zeitung, August 16, 1932; Reichstagshandbuch V. Wahlperiode, 1930, Hrsg. vom Bureau des Reichstags, Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1930.